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INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT: ONE TORT
OR TWO?
A.P. SIMESTER AND WINNIE CHAN*
IT is said to be a tort for D intentionally to induce C to break C’s
contract with P. Where this occurs, P has an action in tort against
D,1 quite apart from P’s action for breach of contract against C.2
But the rationale for this tort is controversial, and its legitimacy
has been doubted by a number of commentators.3 Indeed, it is
uncertain whether the tort has just one rationale—and if so,
whether that is merely an instance of the wider rationale
underpinning a generic tort, of intentionally causing harm by
unlawful means, as Tony Weir has claimed.4 Consider the following
scenarios:
Case 1 (persuasion): C1, a singer, has contracted with P1, a
promoter, to sing exclusively for P1. D1, a rival promoter,
oﬀers C1 a contract to sing instead for D1. C1 agrees to sing
for D1.
Case 2 (prevention): C2, a car manufacturer, has contracted
with P2, a tyre manufacturer, to display P2’s tyres on C2’s cars
while the cars are being exhibited at a motor show. During the
show D2, a rival, removes P2’s tyres without permission and
replaces them with its own.
These scenarios may be regarded as paradigm methods of inducing
a breach of contract. If one is successfully to analyse and justify
that tort, it is necessary to identify the morally salient features of
these paradigms, and explain how those features provide reasons
why the state should intervene on P’s behalf through the law of tort.
As part of that process, the question needs to be resolved whether
* Respectively, Professor of Legal Philosophy, University of Nottingham and Lecturer in Law,
University of Warwick. We are grateful for valuable comments from Antony Duﬀ, Andrew
von Hirsch, Michael Prichard, Paul Roberts, Craig Rotherham, and Christian Witting.
1 Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E. & B. 216, 118 E.R. 749, conﬁrmed in Allen v. Flood [1898] A.C. 1.
2 Cf. Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 1 De G. M. & G. 604, 42 E.R. 687.
3 See, e.g., D. Howarth, Textbook on Tort (London 1995), 484 (‘‘Lumley v. Gye was wrongly
decided’’); Dan D. Dobbs, ‘‘Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships’’ (1980) 34
Ark. L. Rev. 335, 345 (lamenting ‘‘the complete absence of any principle that will explain to us
what judgments to make and why it is that liability sometimes is and sometimes is not
imposed’’); Lyn L. Stevens, ‘‘Interference with Economic Relations—Some Aspects of the
Turmoil in the Intentional Torts’’ (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 595, 595 (‘‘illogical and
piecemeal’’).
4 Economic Torts (Oxford 1997), 28.
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these scenarios present one paradigm or two. Are there, in truth,
two diﬀerent species of the tort of inducing breach of contract, or
are these scenarios merely diﬀerent instances of a unitary tort?
In this paper, we argue that there are indeed two diﬀerent
species of inducing breach of contract, only one of which belongs
inside Weir’s generic tort. The two causes of action have diﬀerent
criteria and, further, have structurally diﬀerent rationales.
Moreover, both causes of action are independently legitimate, in
the sense that each of their underlying rationales supplies good
reasons why tort law should grant a remedy for D’s conduct.
The discussion that follows will proceed in three main parts.
First, we explore the possibility that current law implicitly
recognises two diﬀerent types of inducing breach of contract,
because it imposes diﬀerent criteria for the two forms of the action.
Second, we consider the justifying rationale behind each of the two
forms, by investigating what harm, and what wrong, the torts
protect against. Finally, we discuss how the diﬀerent justifying
rationales behind each form of the tort might help to explain some
of their doctrinal aspects, including the unfortunate distinction that
is sometimes drawn in the cases between ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘indirect’’
modes of prevention.
DISCERNING TWO FORMS OF THE TORT IN THE CASE LAW
The motivation for thinking that, doctrinally, there are two
diﬀerent species of inducing breach of contract is that they appear
to have diﬀerent legal criteria.
The Range of Plaintiﬀs
The locus classicus of inducing breach of contract, Lumley v. Gye,5
is an instance of the ﬁrst paradigm. Its categorising feature is that
the inducement is by an act of persuasion.6 Although this element
has controversial boundaries,7 it is not crucial to pursue those
5 (1853) 2 E. & B. 216, 118 E.R. 749. C, a prominent soprano, had agreed with P (an opera
impresario) to sing exclusively at Her Majesty’s Theatre. D, a rival impresario, was alleged,
knowing of C’s obligation to P, to have persuaded C to sing instead at the Royal Italian
Opera. On the point of law that arose from P’s allegation, the Queen’s Bench held that on
such facts D would have committed a tort against P. (As it happens, the alleged facts were not
later established at trial.) A valuable discussion of the case in its historical context is S.M.
Waddams, ‘‘Johanna Wagner and the Rival Opera Houses’’ (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 431. Although a
number of the judgments in Lumley v. Gye described C as a ‘‘servant’’, by the end of the
nineteenth century it was become clear that the tort extended to protect other forms of
contract, ones not for employment or personal services. See Bowen v. Hall (1881) 6 Q.B.D.
333; Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q.B. 715; C. Carpenter, ‘‘Interference with Contract
Relations’’ (1928) 41 Harv. L.R. 728.
6 For convenience, we use the term ‘‘persuasion’’ in the text to cover any mode of persuasive
inducement.
7 In particular, the distinction between persuasion or inducement and advice. We shall say a
little more about this distinction infra, at p. 160.
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boundaries here: the central point is that, unlike prevention, which
is the marque of the second paradigm, persuasion operates through
the medium of C’s autonomous decision. D does not suppress C’s
free choices, in the way that a blackmailer or racketeer might.
Blackmailers coerce their victims. Through the use of threats, they
create a situation in which the victim is obliged to choose an act
that he does not welcome, and which otherwise he would not do.
The choice that the victim makes is not free; his will is, in a very
real sense, subordinated to the will of the blackmailer. When D
persuades C to breach her contract, however, D does not attack C’s
right to choose what to do. There is not a threat but an oﬀer; C
simply has an additional, and not unwelcome, option which she is
free to reject. Hence her choice (if made) to accept D’s oﬀer, and in
turn to break her contract with P, is C’s choice and not one made
subordinate to the will of D.
By contrast, where performance is prevented, C does not decide
to break her promise to P. She is given no choice in the matter.8
Thus C is at least as much a victim of D’s interference as is P.
Indeed, the wrong to P is in a sense subsidiary, in that the breach
of contract arises as a further consequence of the initial wrongful
act committed against C.9 In the case of persuasion, on the other
hand, the wrong to P is not a simple consequence of D’s
intervention: it occurs only when C subsequently chooses to adopt
D’s inducement and to break the contract with P. This directly
aﬀects the requirements of the tort. Where D prevents performance,
C—as well as P—can sue D for losses arising from the breach of
contract.10 But where D induces a breach by persuasion, C has no
right to sue D.11 The denial to C of a cause of action might be
thought to be a matter of incentives;12 in truth, it is more than
that. It recognises that the very ‘‘essence’’ of the persuasion-tort
rests in a breach of contract,13 and that this wrong is committed by
8 Or at least an inadequate choice, as when D hinders performance without making it entirely
impossible: cf. Dimbleby & Sons Ltd. v. NUJ [1984] 1 W.L.R. 67 (C.A.), not discussed on this
point by the House of Lords [1984] 1 W.L.R. 427.
9 This is why, as we argue below, D’s intention to harm P is indispensable to the prevention
tort. (Indeed, the immediate wrong may be committed by or against a fourth party, E. This
raises the further problem of indirect prevention, discussed below, at pp. 161ﬀ.)
10 Indeed, C’s right of recovery may be even more extensive than P’s, since C may sometimes be
able to recover foreseeable contractual losses by suing D for the original unlawful act (as
when D, a habitual arsonist, burns down C’s factory, foreseeably preventing C from fulﬁlling
her supply contracts with P; something to which D had given no thought).
11 Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 Q.B. 606,
639–640 (Upjohn L.J.); Williams v. Hursey (1959) 103 C.L.R. 30, 77; Brekkes v. Cattel [1972]
1 Ch. 105, 114 (Pennycuick V.-C.). Cf. Camden Exhibition & Display Ltd. v. Lynott [1966] 1
Q.B. 555, 569 (Russell L.J.).
12 Cf. Boulting v. Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 Q.B.
606, 639–640: C ‘‘must resist [D’s] eﬀort by strength of will’’.
13 Allen v. Flood [1898] A.C. 1, 120–121 (Lord Herschell); cf. Stratford v. Lindley [1965] A.C.
269, 340 (Lord Donovan).
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C. D may also be responsible for the wrong that P suﬀers, but D is
not the agent of that wrong. It is inﬂicted by C. Drawing a limited
analogy with existing doctrine, to the extent that C also suﬀers loss
by reason of that wrong, it is self-inﬂicted and subject to the
principle volenti non ﬁt injuria.14 D neither wrongs nor harms C. C
harms herself.
Breach and Unlawful Means
The point that breach of contract is at the heart of Lumley v. Gye
underpins the second diﬀerence between persuasion and prevention.
Doctrinally, it manifests itself in the requirement that D’s act of
persuasion must result in a breach. Hence, the tort does not lie if
C’s non-performance is not a breach of contract, e.g., because the
contract is void15 or because D procures C legitimately to
determine the contract.16 Similarly, the tort cannot be committed if
a contract has not yet been formed and D merely dissuades C from
entering into one.17 As Weir puts it, ‘‘it is right that the plaintiﬀ’s
tort claim lies only if the middleman could be sued for what the
defendant got him to do’’.18 The breach of contract is constitutive
of the harm to P, and the contractual damages that lie against C
are also the measure of his loss against D.
It is a diﬀerent matter where D does not dissuade, but rather
prevents, C from performing his obligations. Here, C’s failure to
perform need not be in breach of contract. One assertion of this
rule is found in Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd. v. Cousins.19 Esso (C) had
contracted to supply the plaintiﬀ hotelier with oil but it then
became embroiled in a labour dispute with the defendants who,
taking industrial action, instructed Esso’s drivers not to make any
further deliveries of the oil. P obtained an injunction against D on
the basis that its right to contractual performance by C was being
interfered with, notwithstanding that a force majeure clause meant
that, to adopt Weir’s phrasing, C could not be sued when prevented
from performing.20 According to Lord Denning M.R., ‘‘[t]he time
has come when the principle [in Lumley v. Gye] should be further
14 And, indeed, to the principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio.
15 See, e.g., De Francesco v. Burnum (1890) 43 Ch. D. 165, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 430; Joe Lee Ltd.
v. Dalmeny [1927] 1 Ch. 300; Greig v. Insole [1978] 3 All E.R. 449.
16 McManus v. Bowes [1938] 1 K.B. 98, 127 (Slesser L.J.); Cutsforth v. Mansﬁeld Inns [1986] 1
W.L.R. 588, 563, D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 702 (Morris L.J.);
Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries Ltd. v. Yorkshire Miners’ Association [1906] A.C. 384, 406;
Associated British Ports v. TGWU [1989] 1 W.L.R. 939, 970 (Stuart-Smith L.J.); White v.
Riley [1921] 1 Ch. 1, 15, 26, 32.
17 Midland Cold Storage Ltd. v. Steer [1972] Ch. 630, 644–645; McKernan v. Fraser (1931) 46
C.L.R. 343.
18 Weir, above note 4, at p. 36 n. 44.
19 [1969] 2 Ch. 106 (C.A.).
20 Above, text at note 18.
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extended to cover ‘deliberate and direct interference with the
execution of a contract without that causing any breach.’ ’’21 In
order to fall within the extensional case, in his Lordship’s view,
‘‘there must be interference in the execution of a contract. The
interference is not conﬁned to the procurement of a breach of
contract. It extends to a case where a third person prevents or
hinders one party from performing his contract, even though it be
not a breach’’.22
Although Lord Denning saw prevention or hindrance as an
extensional case, his remarks were not, strictly speaking, necessary,
since the appeal in Torquay Hotel could have been decided without
needing to make such an extension to existing law.23 Be that as it
may, other cases have conﬁrmed that D commits a tort by
intentionally preventing C from performing her contract with P,
subject to one important proviso: the means of prevention must be
unlawful.24 Hence, it is no tort for X lawfully to buy up the entire
market in widgets that, he knows, Y has contracted to supply to
Z.25 But it is a tort for X deliberately to prevent Y from
performing her contract with Z by stealing all the available
widgets—because the theft is itself an unlawful act.26 The act of
prevention must independently be a tort or otherwise unlawful.
There are scattered dicta that may be read as endorsing a more
wide-ranging formulation of the prevention-tort along the lines
Lord Denning proposed, most notably in Lord Diplock’s judgment
in Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton.27 But such dicta are
21 Ibid., at p. 138.
22 Ibid. (italics omitted).
23 The decision may be explicable on two grounds. First, the contract did not exempt C from
the (primary) obligation to supply fuel to the hotel, but rather exempted C from liability in
the event that his failure to perform was prevented by, inter alia, a labour dispute of the sort
that occurred. Thus the contract contained ‘‘an exception from liability for non-performance
rather than an exception from obligation to perform’’ (per Russell L.J., ibid., at p. 143) and C
was, in law, in breach of contract albeit that P could not sue. Second, the means used by D
to prevent C from performing were in any event unlawful, since they involved procuring C’s
drivers to break their contracts of employment.
24 Lord Denning accepted a requirement of unlawfulness only where the intervention was
indirect: ‘‘Indirect interference will not do. . . . Indirect interference is only unlawful if unlawful
means are used’’. (Ibid., at p. 138; italics in original.) We criticise the distinction between
direct and indirect inteference below, at pp. 161ﬀ.
25 Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 680 (Evershed M.R.); Torquay Hotel Co. Ltd.
v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 138 (Lord Denning M.R.).
26 Per Evershed M.R. in Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 680, ‘‘it seems to me
that the intervener, assuming in all cases that he knows of the contract and acts with the aim
and object of procuring its breach to the damage of B, one of the contracting parties, will be
liable . . . if he intervenes by the commission of some act wrongful in itself so as to prevent A
from in fact performing his contract. . .’’. Note that this proposition is subject to qualiﬁcation,
in that the unlawful means used by D must be a wrong against P; it is not enough that D’s
act is merely unlawful for some incidental reason. See the discussion infra, at p. 146; Lonrho
Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] A.C. 173.
27 [1983] 2 A.C. 570, 608–609 (quoting with approval Lord Denning’s statement of the principle
reproduced above, text at n. 22). Cf. Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ural Caspian Oil Corp.
Ltd. [1995] Ch. 152, 167 (Beldam L.J.): ‘‘it is an actionable tort knowingly to interfere with
136 The Cambridge Law Journal [2004]
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isolated, ﬂawed,28 and outweighed by the weight of authority to the
contrary, both in the cases29 and in the texts.30 In D.C. Thomson &
Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, for example, Lord Evershed M.R. declared that
‘‘acts of a third party lawful in themselves do not constitute an
actionable interference with contractual rights merely because they
bring about a breach of contract, even if they were done with the
object and intention of bringing about such a breach’’.31 Moreover,
this assertion was no mere dictum but part of the ratio decidendi of
the case. By contrast, the few cases where Torquay Hotel has been
relied on successfully by the plaintiﬀ, including Merkur Island, are
cases where the defendant’s act of preventative interference has
been independently unlawful.32 There appears to be no English case
where the plaintiﬀ has succeeded in claiming against a defendant
whose otherwise lawful actions prevented performance of
contractual obligations. Rightly so. Such a claim could not be
reconciled with the fundamental principles laid down in Allen v.
Flood,33 which recognised a legal ‘‘chasm’’ between harm
intentionally caused by lawful means and harm caused by means of
a legally wrongful act.
It seems clear that, by omitting the requirement for an unlawful
act in the prevention-tort, Lord Denning went too far. Yet once the
unlawful act is present, it is also clear that liability for prevention
another’s right to performance of a contractual obligation by preventing or hindering the
other party from performing his obligations under the contract’’. But compare, from the same
judgment, infra n. 29. See too D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 694–695
(Jenkins L.J.), allowing that there would be liability where D ‘‘does an act which, if done by
one of the parties to it, would have been a breach’’. Prima facie, this asserts no requirement
for unlawfulness independent of the contract, but Jenkins L.J. continues: ‘‘[o]f this type of
interference the case of G.W.K. Ld. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ld. 42 T.L.R. 376 aﬀords a striking
example’’. That case, the facts of which form the basis of our paradigm Case 2, clearly
involved intervention by an unlawful act.
28 Although Lord Diplock cited the judgment of Jenkins L.J. in D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v.
Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, Jenkins L.J. never contemplated interference falling short of a breach.
Moreover, his Lordship relied on the fact that Parliament had, in the then Trade Union and
Labour Relations Act 1974, s. 13(1), granted certain immunities from liability for the tort of
interference with contract, as evidence that the tort did exist at common law. But that
provision was broadly drafted in case of future developments in tort law, not on the basis
that such a tort then existed (cf. Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1177 per Lord Reid).
29 E.g., Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Ural Caspian Oil Corp. Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 138, 151
(Hoﬀmann L.J.), where Lord Denning’s proposal is regarded as ‘‘debatable’’. The decision
was reversed on other grounds ([1995] Ch. 152, C.A.), where Beldam L.J. remarked (at 170)
that ‘‘I am not persuaded that an act, otherwise lawful but which to the knowledge of the
person doing it might prevent a third party from seeking equitable relief against breach of a
primary obligation under a contract, is in itself capable of giving rise to a cause of action in
tort’’. Cf. also Middlebrook Mushrooms Ltd. v. TGWU [1993] I.C.R. 612, 620 (Neill L.J.).
30 See, e.g., K.W. Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (3rd edn., Harmondsworth 1986), 611–
617; Howarth, above note 3, at p. 484; Weir, above note 4, at pp. 36–39; B. Markesinis and
S. Deakin, Tort Law (4th edn., Oxford 1999), 476–477; W.V.H. Rogers (ed.), Winﬁeld and
Jolowicz on Tort (15th edn., 1998) 631–632.
31 [1952] Ch. 646, 693.
32 For example, News Group Newspapers v. SOGAT (No. 2) [1987] I.C.R. 181; Falconer v.
ASLEF [1986] I.R.L.R. 331; Dimbleby & Sons Ltd. v. NUJ [1984] 1 W.L.R. 427 (H.L.).
33 [1898] A.C. 1, 121 (Lord Herschell). Cf. The Nadezhda Krupskaya [1997] 2 Lloyd’s L.R. 35, 40
(Rix J.); also F.B. Sayre, ‘‘Inducing Breach of Contract’’ (1923) 36 Harv. L.R. 663, 696ﬀ.
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of performance—whether by direct or indirect means34—can lie in
tort. Moreover, such liability does not require proof of a breach of
contract by C.35
The Mental Element
Finally, it appears that the mental element required to constitute
inducing breach of contract may well diﬀer according to whether
the inducement is by persuasion or prevention. Perhaps surprisingly,
the diﬀerence can be stated neither with conﬁdence nor with
exactitude since it is uncertain what is the requisite mental element
of inducing breach of contract—in either of its forms. Where D
prevents C from performing, it is likely that P acquires a cause of
action against D only if D acts with the intent to harm P, by
depriving P of C’s performance.36 By contrast, it seems that an
intent to harm P is not required when D persuades C to breach her
contract. Indeed, it may even be that recklessness will suﬃce.37 We
will return to discussion of the metal element below.38
Summary
To summarise: The main structural diﬀerences between inducing
breach of contract by persuasion and by prevention are fourfold.
First, prevention requires a wrong committed by D independent of
any contractual wrong by C. Second, prevention does not require
that C’s failure to perform be a contractual wrong by C. Third, C
(as well as P) can sue D for losses arising from C’s non-
performance of the contract only when D induces that non-
performance through prevention rather than through persuasion.
Fourth and tentatively, the mental elements for the two varieties
seemingly diﬀer on the need for an intention to harm P.
Do these structural diﬀerences disclose that they are, in
substance, diﬀerent torts (or, at least, fundamentally diﬀerent
paradigms of inducing breach of contract)? Given that the third
diﬀerence can be explained by standard doctrine (volenti non ﬁt
injuria), why not, as Weir suggests, simply regard the act of
prevention and the persuaded breach of contract as alternative
34 A distinction to which we return, below, at p. 161.
35 Merkur Island, News Group Newspapers v. SOGAT [1987] I.C.R. 181; Falconer v. ASLEF
[1986] I.R.L.R. 331 (but see n. 97 infra).
36 E.g., D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 697 (Jenkins L.J.); Torquay Hotel
Co. Ltd. v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 138 (Lord Denning M.R.). By ‘‘acts with the intent to
harm P’’, we mean that D must be acting deliberately in order to harm P (either for its own
sake or in order to achieve some further purpose of D’s); the injury to P, even if foreseen,
must be more than a mere side-eﬀect of D’s actions—it must be something that D has sought
to bring about. See further infra, n. 89 and text thereat.
37 See, e.g., Emerald Construction v. Lowthian [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691, 700–701 (Lord Denning
M.R.); but see infra, n. 92.
38 Below, at pp. 154ﬀ.
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instances of a more general unitary requirement for an unlawful
act? Nothing in the analysis so far precludes the logical possibility
of that conclusion. As the Legal Realists pointed out decades ago,
cases can very often be assimilated under a common principle if
one is willing to abstract that principle to a suﬃcient level of
generality. On the other hand, neither does our analysis mandate
Weir’s proposal. On the contrary, it shows that there is conceptual
space in the cases within which two separate torts might be
distinguished on non-arbitrary grounds. In the pages below, we
argue that there are indeed normatively salient diﬀerences, which
would be suppressed by Weir’s generalisation.
FINDING NORMATIVE RATIONALES BEHIND LIABILITY FOR INDUCING
BREACH OF CONTRACT: HARMS AND WRONGS
According to Weir, the economic torts are ‘‘concerned with matters
less grave’’ than are torts governing harm to a person’s body or
property.39 One may hesitate to concede this, since the economic
torts and, indeed, the protection of property rights must be justiﬁed
ultimately in terms of the interests of persons. Ultimately, the
reason why recent corporate accounting scandals, such as that at
Enron, are so concerning is not the fraud per se, or even the
amount of money involved, but its widespread and real implications
for the lives of human beings: employees now without work (at
Enron, its auditors, its dependent suppliers, etc.), shareholders,
pension fund holders, and so forth. Whichever the tort, the same
questions must always be asked about its legitimacy: how is this
tort justiﬁed by reference to the interests of persons? What
rationale underpins P’s claim to state intervention on his behalf and
to the detriment of D?
A successful account of inducing breach of contract must
answer these questions by ﬁnding a rationale that both explains the
legal doctrine and justiﬁes it. Moreover, if we are right to
distinguish between persuasion and prevention, there ought to be
two such rationales—one for each form of action. The rationales
must, of course, help to explain the doctrinal diﬀerences we have
observed above. But they must also meet key normative criteria if
they are to justify the tort actions that they underpin.
For one thing, the rationale must show why D’s conduct is the
concern of the state. Frequently situations arise where D ought (or
ought not), morally speaking, to act in some particular way. But it
does not follow that the state should require that he do so. Tort
law is an intrusive and expensive method of restricting the rights of
39 Above note 4, at p. 2.
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a society’s citizens. At least in a liberal society, this sort of coercive
intervention by the state should not be predicated merely on the
fact that D’s act is a moral wrong: like any ﬁeld of law, tort law is
justiﬁed by the fact that it protects the interests of persons, by
addressing conduct that has a signiﬁcant harmful eﬀect on their
lives.40 This restriction on the scope of tort law plays an important
role in moderating the conﬂicting interests of individual members of
a society. It leaves me free to wave my arm around, even if others
disapprove. But my freedom runs out at the end of your nose.
Additionally, the rationale must show why the defendant in
particular should compensate the plaintiﬀ. Tort law reallocates
losses; thus any plausible rationale for inducing breach of contract
needs to explain why losses should not lie where they fall—why D
should be held liable for the loss that P suﬀers. The literature on
this aspect of tort theory is considerable, and a full exploration of
the issues involved lies outside the scope of the present paper.
Broadly speaking, however, we may say that tort law regulates
losses that are caused wrongfully. D is liable for P’s loss because—
and only when—that loss is attributable to a wrong for which D is
responsible.41 For liberal theorists, moreover, it is insuﬃcient to
show that D’s conduct is wrong simpliciter: it must be a wrong to
P. Suppose, for example, that D borrows an old shirt from P but
never returns it. The shirt is worthless and of no use to P; in fact,
P normally throws out his old clothing and he eventually forgets
about the existence of the shirt.42 Its conversion aﬀects him not at
all. Further, the shirt ends up in the hands of T, who is destitute
and in great need of clothing. T’s welfare interest in the clothes is
far greater than P’s. Yet P is wronged by D; and P wrongs no-one
if, later, he discovers the loss and rather selﬁshly reclaims his shirt
from T. P’s act of reclamation falls outside the scope of tort law
because, although T’s welfare is damaged when he is deprived of
possession of the clothes, he has lost nothing to which he had a
right.43
40 Cf. J.S. Mill’s stricture for state action in On Liberty (1859) ch. 1: ‘‘the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others’’.
41 This claim holds most straightforwardly for those torts, including inducing breach of contract,
where an injunction is available against D’s activity. In other torts, it may be that P is
wronged, and D is responsible for that wrong, but D’s activity is not ex ante wrongful. The
explanation of these torts is more complex: liability may, for example, mandate that D
assumes the risk his conduct creates (cf. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330). We
cannot explore these varieties of torts here.
42 Related examples are discussed by J. Gardner and S.C. Shute, ‘‘The Wrongness of Rape’’ in J.
Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (4th series, Oxford 2000), 193, 201 and A.P.
Simester and A. von Hirsch, ‘‘Rethinking the Oﬀense Principle’’ (2002) 8 Legal Theory 269,
282.
43 At least, no right maintainable against P. T may still have possessory rights against someone
else.
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For supporters of inducing breach of contract, the challenge is
to show how the rationale behind the tort complies with these
requirements. In looking to explain and justify any tort of inducing
breach of contract, the explanation must therefore identify the
generic harm addressed by the tort and show that the harm is
suﬃciently important to outweigh countervailing considerations,
such as institutional transaction costs and values like individual
liberty, which militate against any state intervention that places
duties on D and restricts his freedom of action. Further, any
successful explanation of inducing breach of contract must also
show how it is that P has been wronged, and in what way D is
responsible for that wrong.
In the following sections, we will investigate how the two
categories of inducing breach of contract, persuasion and
prevention, satisfy these criteria. We will argue that, although both
categories of the tort protect against the same generic harm, they
diﬀer with regard to the wrong.
Because they involve diﬀerent wrongs, it follows that these are
separate paradigms of inducing breach of contract, which in law
generate structurally diﬀerent causes of action. In order to see this,
it may be helpful to make explicit a preliminary analytical point
upon which we will place reliance. At the level of doctrine, the
form, remedy, and criteria of a tort action should track and
respond to the justifying rationale of that action. Cases that are
paradigm according to that justifying rationale should satisfy the
criteria of the doctrinal action straightforwardly; conversely, cases
that are borderline according to that justifying rationale should not,
ordinarily, fall squarely within the boundaries of the doctrinal
criteria but should lie nearer the periphery and, doctrinally
speaking, look more like hard cases. Correspondingly if, as we
argue, there are two distinct paradigm causes of action in inducing
breach of contract, there should be distinct accounts of how and
why each of those torts is legitimate. The distinction, we argue
below, lies in the wrong.
The Harm of Inducing Breach of Contract
Inducing breach of contract protects contractual rights. The
instrumental reasons for safeguarding contracts against strangers
therefore depend, in turn, upon the grounds for protecting
contracts more generally; upon why we should give contractual
remedies at all. Identifying those more general reasons has proved
controversial, notwithstanding the attentions of a considerable
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literature.44 Joseph Raz illustrates the diﬃculty of this task when he
observes:45
It follows from the harm principle that enforcing voluntary
obligations is not itself a proper goal for contract law. To
enforce voluntary obligations is to enforce morality through
the legal imposition of duties on individuals. In this respect it
does not diﬀer from the legal proscription of pornography.
That is to say, since contractual promises are voluntarily oﬀered
and cannot be imposed by another,46 making such undertakings
obligatory involves the law in enforcing self-created moral duties to
beneﬁt another person—analogous to enforcing altruism. This, it
may be argued, is an improper function for the State to perform,
because it involves the imposition of obligations that, prior to the
law’s intervention, reside purely in morality (speciﬁcally, in the
moral value of promise-keeping). Breach of promise may be a
moral wrong, but where is the harm?
The answer to that last question may seem, at ﬁrst glance,
straightforward. People tend to rely on the reciprocal promises that
constitute a contract. If one of those promises is unfulﬁlled, anyone
who has changed position in anticipation of the promise is likely to
suﬀer loss. On this account, harm appears to be in play and state
intervention may, in principle at least, be justiﬁed.
Answers of this sort locate the harmfulness of promise-breaking
in the reliance by others upon the expectations that a promise
generates. They generate a justiﬁcation of contract law that is
framed in terms of one’s duty not to let others down when they
rely upon one’s promise, rather than a duty to keep one’s promise
per se. Thus they lead toward a reliance-based theory of contract
law and not a promissory theory, assimilating the theory of
contract with that of promissory estoppel.47
Unfortunately, that account of the harm involved in contract
will not do. The justifying rationale that it generates cannot explain
the law’s doctrinal structure, because the central requirements of
contract liability do not reﬂect a reliance-based rationale. In order
to establish a cause of action in contract, it is neither necessary nor
suﬃcient for P to show any change of position consequent upon
D’s promise. What P must show is oﬀer and acceptance: an
44 A useful survey can be found in Stephen A. Smith, ‘‘Towards a Theory of Contract’’ in J.
Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Fourth Series, Oxford 2000), 107.
45 J. Raz, ‘‘Promises in Morality and Law’’ (1982) 95 Harv. L.R. 916, 937. The objection is
explored more fully by Smith, supra n. 44, at pp. 109ﬀ.
46 Cf. such well-known cases as Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) 11 C.B. (N.S.) 859, 142 E.R. 1037.
47 See, e.g., the work of Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford 1979);
Promises, Morals and Law (Oxford 1981); ‘‘Contract, Promises and the Law of Obligations’’
in his Essays on Contract (Oxford 1986) 10.
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agreement, not reliance upon that agreement. Further, even though
P frequently suﬀers loss when D breaches a contractual undertaking
upon which P has relied, reliance losses are not the measure of
contractual damages. Contractual remedies are not calculated by
reference to compensation for loss suﬀered, but by reference to
making good P’s legitimate contractual expectations. Thus,
although reliance theories might be capable of justifying some,
hypothetical, system of private law, they do not justify the common
law of contract that we have because they cannot explain the core
features of that system. Another rationale must be found.
A more promising attempt to justify the institution of contract
involves likening contracts to property. On this view, the promises
we receive form part of our stock of goods; they are part of our
personal resources with which we may improve our own lives. In
turn, we are harmed when those promises are broken because our
stock of goods is diminished. Hence the rules governing formation
of contract are, at root, like the rules governing the creation of
legal interests in property.48
One strength of this analogy is that it transfers easily to the tort
of inducing breach of contract, since it disposes of the conceptual
objection that inducing breach of contract eﬀectively allows
contracting parties by their acts to impose legal duties upon
strangers. Acts that lead to the creation of property rights do just
the same thing; hence the objection fails, at least qua conceptual
objection.49
The property metaphor suggests that the rationales underpinning
the State’s enforcement of property rights might analogously be
deployed to justify the State’s enforcement of contract rights. This
seems right, but we must still be careful about the analysis. It will
not suﬃce to point to the violation of the (property or contract)
right per se as supplying the wrongful harm that warrants state
intervention. That would lead to a circularity because, in most
modern societies, property and contract rights are not pre-legal.
Rather, their recognition (and redistribution) is itself a matter of
legal rules, and moreover of rules that have varied considerably
across diﬀerent periods of social and common-law development. It
48 For an argument along these lines, see Smith, above note 44. In Smith’s account, promises are
constitutive of a special relationship between promisor and promisee. Hence his account can
be aligned with the one here, in that the special relationship, which is intrinsically valuable,
can be regarded as a part of the promisor’s stock of goods. Even so, given that these are
voluntarily created goods, it is not obvious how Smith’s move is enough by itself to satisfy
the requirement for harm (as he thinks it does), without the further arguments made here.
49 It remains, of course, a prima facie reason against having such a tort, since it involves a
circumvention of those strangers’ freedoms, a circumvention to which they have not assented.
The harm at stake in inducing breach of contract must therefore be suﬃcient to outweigh the
harm inﬂicted by restricting those freedoms.
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follows that the harm resulting from a violation of such rights
cannot, by itself, justify legal remedies since the very existence of
those rights is determined by the state—and their legitimate
protection by tort would, in eﬀect, be self-justifying and without an
independent moral basis.
Rather, state enforcement of contractual promises is warranted
because the community as a whole would also suﬀer harm were the
general regime of contract law to be undermined. The relevant
harm is thus of a lost-opportunity kind, where the ineﬀectiveness of
a contract-law regime would result in a substantial loss of
opportunity for personal and social advancement through reliable
coordinated economic activity. Minimising or preventing that
prospective, lost-opportunity, harm underpins state intervention to
enforce contracts.50
The force of this justiﬁcation depends on the crystallizing role of
rights. To recall the example given earlier, misappropriating P’s old
clothes harms not only the interest, if any, that P has in the
clothes; it also undermines the regime by which P’s property right
in the clothes is recognized. That is to say, more than one type of
interest is at stake when P’s clothes are converted. Apart from P’s
immediate interest in the clothes, both P and others have an
interest in the existence of a system for allocating and reallocating
property rights in general. Thus, even where a conversion does not
set back P’s personal interests, it sets back the interest we all have
in the eﬀective existence of a property law regime. The regime itself
serves our well-being, by providing a reliable means through which
we can seek to improve our own lives via the voluntary acquisition,
use, and exchange of resources. Having such a regime augments
our autonomy: it does so even if the particular form of the regime
is distributively imperfect and fails in itself to secure an optimal set
of proprietary entitlements for citizens.51 The same can be said for
breach of contract, where the harm lies not only in a loss of
expectation to P under the contract (a loss that may or may not
damage P) but, more fundamentally, in the consequent undermining
of the practice of exchanging enforceable promises. Even if this
practice is ﬂawed, its reliability promotes our well-being.
50 See also J. Danforth, ‘‘Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society’s Interest
in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity’’ (1981) 81 Col. L.R. 1491, 1511ﬀ. This is
not to deny that non-fulﬁlment of a contractual promise may harm P, or that inducing breach
of contract should protect against this harm; but the harm is parasitic. It provides a
justiﬁcation for intervention only once it is accepted that the institution of contract should be
defended by the state. Once the case for a regime of contractual rights is accepted, further
more speciﬁc harms may be crystallised by the rights themselves. The reservation here is that
those more speciﬁc harms do not justify state intervention unless the regime by which they are
created is itself justiﬁed.
51 See J. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge 1992), 350–354.
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By extending liability to strangers who induce breaches of
contract, tort law protects P from any particular loss he may suﬀer
when C does not perform as promised, and protects the regime of
contract law generally. Assuming that it does in fact play a role in
deterring some instances of contractual breaches,52 the tort
therefore satisﬁes the requirement for harm. Moreover, the harm
against which it protects is the same, irrespective whether the tort is
committed by persuasion to breach or by prevention of
performance. In both forms of the tort, D’s actions attack P’s right
to performance and, behind that, the practice of exchanging
promises to create enforceable agreements.53 They do so by
undermining the dependability of the promise that P receives; which
in turn restricts P’s ability to plan his life, both in reliance on the
promises he has exchanged already and in reliance on the
expectation of being able to improve his life by entering into
transactions in the future.
The Wrongfulness of Inducing Breach of Contract
We conclude that the prevention of harm does supply a ground
why the state should intervene to remedy inducing breach of
contract, and that the ground it supplies is indiﬀerent between
persuasion and prevention. However, as we noted earlier, harm is
not by itself suﬃcient to justify intervention, since there must also
be a reason why D, in particular, should bear the cost of P’s loss—
there must be a reason why D wrongs P. The next task is to
identify that reason.
A generic wrong?
For Weir, the wrong is generic: the wrongful act is one that causes
harm (i) where the harm is intentional and (ii) the act involves an
unlawful means.54 As such, Weir argues that the entirety of inducing
breach of contract has been absorbed within, and should be
understood as an instance of, the more general tort of intentionally
52 While this assumption seems to us to be reasonable, in principle it raises an empirical
question that we cannot investigate here.
53 This practice is undermined even in the case of eﬃcient breach; in our view, inducing breach
of contract cuts across the distinction between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient breach. Thus the
problem of eﬃcient breach is no more a challenge to inducing breach of contract than it is to
contract law itself—the former challenge is parasitic on the latter. Indeed, eﬃcient breaches do
not imply third parties at all, let alone third parties who initiate breaches. In any event, as we
argue below, damages for persuasion to breach are measured by contractual damages; hence,
the operation of any eﬃcient breach doctrine would, as it should, feed indirectly to the tort
by means of the contract.
54 Weir, ‘‘Chaos or Cosmos? Rookes, Stratford and the Economic Torts’’ [1964] C.L.J. 225, 226:
it is ‘‘tortious intentionally to damage another by means of an act which the actor was not at
liberty to commit’’. Cf. Weir, above note 4, at p. 28.
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causing harm by unlawful means. On that analysis, prevention and
persuasion are assimilated.
It is a great strength of Weir’s analysis that he identiﬁes
intentionality as part of what makes D’s conduct a wrong. For the
moment, however, we shall defer this diﬃcult point and focus on
the element of unlawfulness. That element is, we think,
problematic. At the generic level, the meaning of ‘‘unlawful means’’
may seem clear, but it is not. Indeed, it is insuﬃcient that the act is
unlawful.55 What is required is that D’s act be a wrong against P;
the bare fact that an act is unlawful, even criminal, may not
establish that requirement, since the illegality may arise for an
entirely unrelated reason.56
In respect of preventing performance, this problem of vagueness
about what counts as unlawful cannot be avoided. In the famous
case of Allen v. Flood,57 the House of Lords decided conclusively
that it is no tort for D intentionally to inﬂict economic harm.58 The
true general tort, on their Lordships’ analysis,59 arises only where D
intentionally causes harm to P using wrongful means. Hence, where
D prevents C from performing, his intention to harm P is
insuﬃcient; we must also enquire whether that preventative act was
independently unlawful.
By contrast, when the breach is induced by persuasion, in Weir’s
analysis the unlawful means requirement can be met by one event
only: the breach of contract itself. Correspondingly, we saw earlier
that no action lies where the contract is void or C’s response is a
valid rescission.60 Contractual breach may seem a more
straightforwardly identiﬁable event, but there are two diﬃculties
about using the fact of breach to crystallise liability. First, what of
the case where D causes C to breach her contract by using lawful
means to prevent performance? That, as we have noted, is not a
tort;61 but if breaching the contract is itself an unlawful means,
55 ‘‘It is, however, not every ‘unlawful’ act or means which allows for an action in tort, even if
damage is intended and caused’’. Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th edn., 2000) x 24–91. For
example, it appears that contempt of court does not count as unlawful means: Chapman v.
Honig [1963] 2 Q.B. 502, approved in Harrow LBC v. Johnston [1997] 1 W.L.R. 459, 471
(Lord Hoﬀman); contrast Acrow (Automation) Ltd. v. Rex Chainbelt Inc. [1971] 3 All E.R.
1175. See H. Carty, ‘‘Intentional Violation of Economic Interests: The Limits of Common
Law Liability’’ (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 250, 265ﬀ.
56 Cf. Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] A.C. 173.
57 [1898] A.C. 1.
58 Notwithstanding that it is a tort intentionally to inﬂict physical harm to the plaintiﬀ, cf.
Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 58–59. The division extends to negligence: ‘‘The
inﬂiction of physical injury to the person or property of another universally requires to be
justiﬁed. The causing of economic loss does not’’. Murphy v. Brentwood DC [1991] 1 A.C.
398, 487 (Lord Oliver).
59 As Weir argues, above note 4, at pp. 21ﬀ.
60 See above, text at note 15.
61 Above, text at and following note 24.
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then prima facie it satisﬁes Weir’s criteria in this case too. Weir
resists that conclusion:62
The case is entirely diﬀerent where I disable the contractor
from performing though he would if he could, or it otherwise
what I do has the immediate eﬀect, without any intervening
conduct or decision on the part of anyone else, that P does not
get what was promised. . . . Just as I am not liable for
persuading the contractor to do something which involves no
breach, so I am not liable for preventing his performance,
whether that causes a breach or not. I shall of course be liable
if I myself use wrongful means in either case, but not if I
don’t.
So: on Weir’s account, the breach of contract is, vis-a`-vis D, an
unlawful means when it is freely chosen by C with D’s
encouragement; but not when it is caused, without C’s consent, by
D’s actions. This analysis is unconvincing. The exception Weir seeks
to carve out is ad hoc. In both cases, C’s failure to perform is a
breach of contract and if, in virtue of being a breach of contract, it
is unlawful in one case then it must be unlawful in the other. The
classiﬁcation of speciﬁc torts within a generic category of this sort
is only meaningful if the unifying element, unlawfulness, has some
independent content that does not vary across those speciﬁc torts.
In Weir’s analysis, clearly, that is not the case.63
There is another problem about relying on the breach of
contract to crystallise liability. It is true that only in the case of
persuasion does C make a deliberate choice to breach.
Unquestionably, that deliberate breach wrongs P, by violating P’s
right to performance. But if anything, it seems even harder to
regard that breach as a means by which D harms P than it does in
the case of prevention. When chosen deliberately, the breach is not
D’s act. It is C’s. C’s wrong, moreover, is fully remedied by the law
of contract. This being the case, why make D responsible for that
breach?64 Weir’s account lacks the resources to tell us when, and
why, D’s conduct can be married with C’s wrong so that D is
implicated in that wronging of P. We need further reasons, besides
pointing to the breach of contract, why D should be held
responsible for the harm that P suﬀers.
62 Above note 4, at p. 35.
63 Neither, it seems, is this true of tort law more generally. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard [1964]
A.C. 1129, 1209–1210 (Lord Devlin), Associated British Ports v. TGWU [1989] 1 W.L.R. 939
(C.A.; reversed on other grounds, ibid., H.L.), and Barretts and Baird (Wholesale) Ltd. v.
IPCS [1987] I.R.L.R. 3, 9, where it is suggested that what constitutes an unlawful means may
diﬀer across diﬀerent economic torts.
64 As Howarth puts it (above note 3, at p. 484), ‘‘there is no reason to give the plaintiﬀ
remedies beyond its contractual remedies . . .’’.
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Grounding the wrong in the harm
One way of approaching this challenge is to consider whether P is
wronged in any other way—in particular, whether P has any other
rights that are violated apart from his right to C’s performance. In
an important recent essay, Roderick Bagshaw proposes that P has
two prima facie entitlements, constituting the ‘‘protectable interest’’
behind actions for inducing breach of contract. The entitlements
are, ﬁrst, to C’s willingness to perform (the persuasion-right) and,
second, to C’s existing capacity to perform (the prevention-right).65
In Bagshaw’s analysis, these are rights somewhat akin in nature to
property rights,66 in that they are not held against a particular
person but can be asserted against the rest of the world; albeit their
protection through tort law is less comprehensive than is the
protection generally aﬀorded to property per se.
There are a number of implications of this type of approach. By
formulating the protectable interests as property-like entitlements,
Bagshaw redirects attention from the wrong to the harm. Each
entitlement, when attacked, represents a form of harm. At the same
time, since both those forms of harm are similarly proprietary-like,
Bagshaw suggests that procuring a breach and preventing
performance might be assimilated as a unitary tort.67 The analogy
with the property torts also makes it plausible that the
requirements of liability for the tort might include a less stringent
mental state than direct intention by D to induce a breach. Given
that it is prima facie wrong to infringe another person’s proprietary
entitlement, the function of mental state requirements in property
torts seems mainly to be establishing suﬃcient fault for liability to
rest with D. Recklessness, or even negligence, might suﬃce for that
task.
Notwithstanding the obvious attractions of Bagshaw’s analogy,
it seems to us that these formulations of P’s entitlement are
inappropriate. Moreover, they are inappropriate for very diﬀerent
reasons, something that points against rather than toward their
assimilation. Consider, ﬁrst, the possibility that P has an
entitlement-right to C’s existing capacity to perform. The metaphor
is overtly proprietary: we might say that, by preventing
performance, D ‘‘misappropriates’’ C’s capacity to perform. But
even if we grant such a metaphor, the misappropriation is from C.
65 ‘‘Inducing Breach of Contract’’ in J. Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Fourth
Series, Oxford 2000), 131, 137.
66 An account that is not without precedent: see, e.g., F. Pollock, The Law of Torts (London
1887) 451; W. Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract (10th edn., Oxford 1903) 242.
See also R. Epstein, ‘‘Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible
Ownership’’ (1987) 16 J. Leg. Stud. 1.
67 Above note 65, at pp. 146–148.
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It is not obvious why it is a taking from P. Why would P have a
corresponding right of that sort? The core of the contract is that P
has bargained for, or bought a right to, C’s performance, typically
at some future date. However diﬃcult or easy it becomes for C to
perform—and for whatever reason—P has no cause of action
against anyone unless C does not, in fact, perform. Indeed, at the
time the bargain is made, C may have no existing capacity to
perform. Neither does that by itself matter, provided C acquires
that capacity in time to complete. Thus what seems to matter is not
C’s existing capacity but her future capacity to perform. Yet on
that count, it seems clear that P can have no right held against the
rest of the world to C’s future capacity to perform, since that
would impose positive duties upon strangers to ensure that C
acquires such a capacity.68 If P has any right of this sort, it can
only be an action-right: a right that strangers not act to prevent C
from performing. To conceive of the tort as protecting an interest
in C’s existing capacity to perform generates an unstable analysis.
It is also inapt to conceive of P as having a quasi-property right,
held against the rest of the world, to C’s willingness to perform.
For one thing, analogies to property rights are inadmissible in the
context of another person’s mental state. Hence the metaphor of
theft does not carry over into persuasion—D cannot be said to
‘‘steal’’ C’s willingness to perform. Crudely put, people are not
objects. When it comes to other persons’ attitudes, emotions,
intentions, and the like, ownership analogies are entirely misplaced;
indeed, they are inconsistent with the principles of individual
autonomy that are cornerstones of any liberal society. It is true that
moral rights of this sort exist: my son has a right that I think of
him as a human being, and not just as a thing to be treated well
and programmed into adulthood. But such rights are not the stuﬀ
of law. Legal rights are properly concerned with how people
behave, rather than with who they are or what they think.
More generally, there is a fundamental problem about
explaining the wrongfulness of inducing breach of contract using
property-based analogies. The unarticulated premise underlying this
approach is that causes of action can only be diﬀerentiated if they
remedy diﬀerent harms (or, in Bagshaw’s analysis, if they protect
diﬀerent interests). According to this view, if the harm is the same
then the wrong must be the same, since the wrong consists simply
in the unjustiﬁed causing of that harm. But the relation between
68 A point seen by Bagshaw: ibid., at pp. 137–138. Indeed, a similar objection might be made to
the claim that P has a right to C’s existing capacity to perform. Prima facie, such a right
could generate a positive obligation of maintenance in strangers, e.g., to repair diminutions in
C’s capacity to perform.
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harm and wrong is not this simple. Many actions are deﬁned not
exclusively in terms of their eﬀects, harmful or otherwise, but also
in terms of the intentions with which they are done. John Finnis
conveys this point nicely when he describes69
. . . the common unsound assumption that human acts can be
identiﬁed, for the purposes of moral or legal assessment,
independently of the acting person’s intention(s). But countless
acts cannot be truly identiﬁed for what they are (prior to
assessment as right or wrong, lawful or unlawful) unless and
until the outward behaviour which they involve is understood
as the carrying out of such and such an intention. Should this
pat on the back be deemed a greeting, a warning, an
encouragement, a condescension, a code sign to waiting police
oﬃcers, or something else?
In Finnis’s example, the actor’s intention is integral to the nature of
the action he performs. It is also integral to the moral character of
that action.70 Thus it may be only the actor’s intention which
makes an action wrong. For this very reason, blackmail cannot be
committed inadvertently.71 Neither can duress more generally. If we
focus simply on the harmfulness of actions, there is a tendency to
ground the wrong just in the harm and to treat the diﬀerences
between D’s mental states simply as a matter of relative degrees of
fault. That is an error. Sometimes the diﬀerence between D’s
intentionally bringing about an outcome and his doing so
negligently resides not just in the degree of culpability, but also in a
changed wrong72 or even a wrong where there is none otherwise.73
Hence a person who sets out to inﬂict economic injury on P
wrongs P in a way that is fundamentally diﬀerent from another
person who inadvertently but carelessly does something that leads P
to suﬀer economic loss.74 That diﬀerence cannot be captured by
describing the harm, or ‘‘protectable interest’’, at stake. The harm
is the same.
69 ‘‘Intention in Tort Law’’ in D.G. Owen (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford
1995) 229, 239.
70 It is no accident that one of the ﬁlm versions of Choderlos de Laclos’s book, Les Liaisons
Dangereuses, is entitled Cruel Intentions.
71 Cf. G. Lamond, ‘‘Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail’’ in A.P. Simester and
A.T.H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability (Oxford 1996) 215. Lamond points out that a key
diﬀerence between a blackmailing threat and an oﬀer or a warning lies in the intentions of the
person who delivers it.
72 For example, the distinction between vandalism and negligent property damage is not simply
that the former is more culpable. Vandalism expresses a contempt for society and for the
victim that negligently causing damage does not.
73 Thus advice that warns a person of the consequences is not persuasion: Cutsforth v. Mansﬁeld
Inns Ltd. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 558, 563 (Sir Neil Lawson). Neither is it a threat or intimidation:
White v. Riley [1921] 1 Ch. 1, 13 (Lord Sterndale M.R.).
74 Finnis, supra n. 69. Finnis’s depiction (at p. 241) of ‘‘the Allen v. Flood rule that motive or
intention is irrelevant’’ is something of a misdescription. Intention is relevant, and not just in
the case of conspiracies. Allen v. Flood only decides that it is insuﬃcient.
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The practice of promising
We conclude that neither Weir’s nor Bagshaw’s accounts are capable
of explaining fully what is wrong about inducing breach of contract.
The underlying reason for this, we think, is that both accounts
disregard an important, contract-related, wrong that is involved in
persuading C to breach. This wrong reﬂects a second moral right
that P acquires when she enters into a contract with C, over and
above the obvious moral and legal right to performance. Assuming,
as we do, that the foundation of contract is agreement by means of
promises, let us consider the nature of promising. As Raz puts it, the
principles that best explain the activity of promising:75
present promises as creating a relation between the promisor
and promisee—which is taken out of the general competition
of conﬂicting reasons. It creates a special bond, binding the
promisor to be, in the matter of the promise, partial to the
promisee. It obliges the promisor to regard the claim of the
promisee as not just one of the many claims that every person
has for his respect and help but as having peremptory force.
A promise changes the relationship between promisor and promisee:
the promise, once given, creates a reason that did not previously
exist, obliging the promisor to treat the promisee as special. We can
illustrate this point with an example. Suppose Jane promises to give
£100 to charity X at the end of the month, because she wishes to
support its famine-relief activities in Africa. Before the end of the
month arrives, Jane discovers that charity Y is spending a higher
proportion of its received donations upon famine relief in Africa.
Her original reasons for giving the money would, she now sees, be
better served by giving the money to Y. But, by promising to give the
money to X, Jane has introduced a new factor: a pre-emptive reason,
to do as she promised and not to reconsider.
It follows from the nature of promising that the promisee has
two rights: the right to pre-emptive status in the promisor’s
reasoning, and the right to performance. When C promises P that
she will do X, she obliges herself to do X, and she also obliges
herself to do X because she promised to (and not because, when the
time came, she reconsidered and made a fresh decision to do X). In
so doing, and by marking out P as special—as the beneﬁciary of
peremptory reasons—C creates a special relation between herself
and P, a relation that is intrinsically valuable.76 Wrongdoing by C
75 J. Raz, ‘‘Promises and Obligations’’, in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and
Society (Oxford 1977) 210, 227–228.
76 Cf. Raz, ‘‘Promises in Morality and Law’’ (1982) 95 Harv. L.R. 916, 928: ‘‘The moral
presuppositions of this conception of promising are the desirability of special bonds between
people and the desirability of special relations that are voluntarily shaped and developed by
the choice of participants’’.
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may vest in either of these facets of promising, and indeed C may
wrong P even if she does as she promises. Consider the following
example:
Uncle U promises his nephew N that he will give N £100 if N
passes his forthcoming examinations. N does pass. Upon
hearing this news, U thinks further about whether to give N
the £100 and decides to do so, reasoning that his giving N the
money on this occasion will reinforce the incentive for N
should U decide to make any similar promises in the future.
Does U wrong N? We think he does, in that although U ultimately
pays up as promised, he does so for the wrong reasons—not simply
because he promised.77 The moral worth of U’s action is tainted by
the fact that it done for manipulative purposes, and N would be
entitled to be hurt were he to discover the truth of U’s motives.
This facet of promising underpins Weir’s depiction of the wrong in
play when D persuades C not to perform:78
If I persuade someone, whether by stick or carrot, to conduct
himself at variance with his duties under a contract, I have
altered his conduct, I have perverted him, or converted him to
my use as a means of inﬂicting harm which would otherwise
not occur. . . .
Weir rightly distinguishes the simple ‘‘I have altered his conduct’’
from the further ‘‘I have perverted him’’. When D persuades C not
to perform, D not only undermines the performance of the
undertaking, but also successfully attacks the very status of that
undertaking as a reason-generating promise. Contrast prevention,
where C’s conduct is also altered but where, from P’s point of view,
the only thing attacked is the performance itself. C is not
‘‘seduced’’79 into disregarding her promise.
This explains why, in the case of persuasion, D’s actions are
intimately bound up with the breach of contract even though that
breach is committed freely by C. The breach is not caused by D. It
is committed by C, but D is also responsible for the wrong to P—
causation is not the only way of being involved.80 In a sense, D
becomes answerable to P not because he directly harms P but
because he attacks the contract itself. D subverts the peremptory
nature of C’s contractual promise, something to which P has a
77 It does not follow, of course, that N should be able to sue U for breach of contract. He is
wronged, but he suﬀers no legally-recognised harm.
78 Above note. 4, at p. 34 (italics in original).
79 Ibid., at p. 35.
80 Cf. P. Sales, ‘‘The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability’’ [1990] C.L.J. 491, esp.
502ﬀ; D.J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford 1999), 180
(noting that forms of civil secondary liability appear to have been founded upon analogies to
the criminal law).
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beneﬁcial right. Thus the connection between D and the wrong to
P runs through the contract.
At the same time, because the breach is autonomously chosen
by C it is misleading to depict C, as Weir does, as having been
‘‘used’’ by D. The language of use might suggest that D exploits C
in order cause harm to P by means of the breach of contract: that
C is merely D’s instrument. But nothing in the persuasion tort
requires that there be any exploitation, or that D wrong C in any
way. The tort is committed even when C chooses freely to alter her
conduct. Neither is there any requirement that D be aiming at P in
any way: D’s concern may simply be to obtain C’s performance for
himself. It is a seduction, not a use.
Conversely, in the case of prevention, there is nothing
distinctively contractual about the harm that P suﬀers. What counts
is that P suﬀers a harm, and that harm was inﬂicted deliberately by
D using unlawful means. The distinctive feature associated with
contractual rights—that C will act because of his promise—is not
attacked. Hence, it is not a contractual wrong that makes D
answerable to P but rather, as we shall see below, D’s intention to
harm P. As such, the prevention tort seems rightly analysed by
Weir and others as a standard category of the more general tort of
causing economic loss by unlawful means (or, as doctrine would
have it, of unlawful interference with trade).
SOME DOCTRINAL PAY-OFFS
The rationales that we have identiﬁed both account for, and
diﬀerentiate between, the wrongfulness of persuading C to breach
and of preventing C from performing. In so doing, they help to
explain some of the central features of the two torts. There is not
scope here to consider, let alone resolve, all the doctrinal issues
surrounding inducing breaches of contract; our remarks on the
following pages are necessarily illustrative and selective. But it
seems to us that the resolution of many of these issues has been
hampered—indeed, made impossible—by a failure in the case-law
to distinguish clearly between the two causes of action. The task is
greatly facilitated once the requirements of each tort are separately
debated.
Breach and Unlawful Means
First, and perhaps most obviously, it can now be seen why
prevention of performance need not be tied closely to remedies for
contractual breach. Torquay Hotel turns out, on its facts, to be
C.L.J. Inducing Breach of Contract 153
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 02 Jun 2009 IP address: 137.205.202.8
rightly decided.81 In the prevention tort, it is necessary to show that
D causes harm to P, and this harm may be established by reference
to contractual expectations; but there is no reason why the measure
of damages should be limited by the contract, since the
wrongfulness of causing that harm arises independently of the
contract—it rests in the unlawful means used by D and in the fact
that those means were used with intention to harm P. The fact that
no claim for damages lies against C is, on this analysis, neither here
nor there.
By contrast, inducing breach of contract by persuasion is bound
tightly to C’s breach of an enforceable promise, since it is D’s role
in undermining the promise that constitutes his wrong to P. Thus it
seems right that the tort does not lie against D where breach of
contract does not lie against C, for example because the contract is
void or because D has merely persuaded C legitimately to
determine the contract.82
The Mental Elements
Second, our analysis also has implications for the mental elements
required by the two torts; the requirements for which, as we noted
earlier, are somewhat unclear. It is generally accepted that
negligence is insuﬃcient.83 Beyond that, the case law is unresolved.
At ﬁrst blush, there is considerable authority that an act of
inducing a breach of contract must be intentional, and that D must
know about the existence of the contract: thus there is said to be a
‘‘two-fold’’ requirement,84 for knowledge85 of the contract and an
intention to induce its breach.86
Yet it is doubtful to what extent this really is a ‘‘two-fold’’
requirement. Markesinis and Deakin, for example, assert that ‘‘[t]he
relevant mental state is that of intention: the defendant must intend
81 Above, text at note 19.
82 Above, text at note 15.
83 Lubenham Fidelities and Investments Co. Ltd. v. S Pembrokeshire DC (1986) 33 B.L.R. 39, 73–
76 (C.A.).
84 Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v. Laughton [1983] 2 A.C. 570, 608 (Lord Diplock); Middlebrook
Mushrooms Ltd. v. TGWU [1993] I.C.R. 612, 621 (Neill L.J.).
85 Sometimes, knowledge of the contract will be imputed, especially in interlocutory hearings.
But this appears to be an evidential rather than a substantive step, not being one that
introduces liability for inadvertent acts of inducement: thus ‘‘a third party may be deemed to
know of the almost certain existence of a contract and indeed of some of its likely terms’’
(Middlebrook Mushrooms Ltd. v. TGWU [1993] I.C.R. 612, 621 per Neill L.J.), this is really a
matter of inference (cf. Stratford v. Lindley [1965] A.C. 269, 324: ‘‘reasonable to infer’’ per
Lord Reid) from circumstances where anyone in D’s position would have known of the
existence of the relevant contracts; typically, where D is an experienced trade union oﬃcial
who is familiar with the workings of his industry (cf. Merkur Island Shipping Corp. v.
Laughton [1983] 2 A.C. 570, 608, per Lord Diplock).
86 See, e.g., D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] 1 Ch. 646, 695 (Jenkins L.J.): ‘‘with
knowledge of the contract and the intention of bringing about its breach’’; Rookes v. Barnard
[1964] A.C. 1129, 1212 (Lord Devlin).
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to interfere with the plaintiﬀ’s contractual rights, in the sense of
doing so knowingly’’.87 But there is no ordinary sense of ‘‘intend’’
that means ‘‘knowingly’’. One can intend an outcome without
knowing that it will occur88 and, conversely, one who induces a
breach of contract knowingly may not intend so to do. Strictly
speaking, D intends only those outcomes that he acts in order to
bring about. That is to say, D intends a result only if he acts with
the aim, purpose, or object of bringing that result about, either for
its own sake (i.e., as an end in itself ) or for the sake of achieving
some further outcome to which the intended result is a means.
Things done as means or ends are intended; side-eﬀects, even
known side-eﬀects, are not.89 The judge who sentences a criminal to
jail may know that, in so doing, she will prevent him from
performing his employment-contract obligations. Yet no-one would
suggest that she thereby intends that outcome.
In other cases, however, D’s knowledge appears to be crucial to
his liability. Consider, for example, the scenario in Lumley v. Gye.90
D persuaded C to sing at D’s theatre, realising that doing so would
put C in breach of her obligation to sing exclusively for P. Very
often, in such circumstances D acts as he does in order to secure
C’s singing services; being content to do so whether or not that
would put C in breach of contract with P. D does not seek to bring
about the breach of contract by C either as a means or an end.
Rather, he is liable because he knows that breach is an inevitable
side-eﬀect of the end that D seeks (C’s singing for D).
Given that cases such as this are—rightly—paradigm examples
of the tort, this may seem to support the view that, at least in
respect of persuasion, the true focus of the law is on the element of
knowledge, or perhaps even recklessness, rather than on intention.
Lord Denning M.R. thought so in Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Lowthian, asserting ‘‘it is unlawful for a third person to procure a
breach of contract knowingly, or recklessly, indiﬀerent whether it is
a beach or not’’.91 Noting this, Bagshaw plausibly concludes:92
87 Tort Law (4th edn.), 471–472.
88 Suppose that D ﬁres his riﬂe, aiming to hit his enemy, P, in the distance. D can intend to kill
P notwithstanding that, at that range, his likelihood of succeeding is low.
89 Another way of putting this division is that the purposes, or ends, for which D acts are the
reasons why one acts. They motivate and explain D’s action. Intention embraces both these
and the intermediate steps (the means) that D undertakes in order to achieve those ends. Side-
eﬀects are those outcomes that, whether or not foreseen by D, did not motivate him to act as
he did. See Finnis, supra n. 69, at pp. 229ﬀ; Finnis, ‘‘Intention and side-eﬀects’’ in R.G. Frey
and C.W. Morris (eds.), Liability and Responsibility (Cambridge 1991) 32; A.P. Simester and
Winnie Chan, ‘‘Intention Thus Far’’ [1997] Crim. L.R. 704.
90 (1853) 2 E. & B. 216, 118 E.R. 749.
91 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 691, 701. Cf. J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn., Sydney 1998), 762: in
the context of inducing a breach of contract, ‘‘[i]ndiﬀerence is equated with intent’’.
92 Above note 65, at p. 142. Wedderburn also suggests that recklessness is suﬃcient: A.M.
Dugdale (gen. ed.), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th edn., London 2000), x 24–20. But the
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Thus it seems that the required mental state for the tort of
procuring breach of contract is a suﬃcient degree of
knowledge of the likelihood that conduct may bring about a
breach of contract, and a choice to persist with that conduct
despite the knowledge.
Bagshaw’s analysis abandons the orthodox insistence on intention,
favouring an advertent-recklessness standard. But that still leaves
open the question of what degree of foresight is ‘‘suﬃcient’’.
Presumably it would not be enough for D merely to suspect or
recognise that there might exist a contract that is inconsistent with
D’s oﬀer to C. Arguably, neither should it suﬃce if D recognises
there is a signiﬁcant albeit unintended risk that his conduct will
induce C to breach a contract. Part of the reason is consequential.
Liability for foreseen side-eﬀects has the potential to restrict
genuine competition and also to hinder the ability of parties to take
action in disputes (for fear of putting the other party in breach of
downstream contracts):93
Interference with contracts may ﬂow from competition and is
the normal and expected consequence of industrial action. It
would not be right for the law to discourage competition by
encouraging actions by unsuccessful competitors or to allow
tort actions by those who suﬀer only incidentally from another
person’s activities.
These concerns about broadening the tort too far into recklessness
have even led some writers to suggest that D must also be shown
to have intended to harm P; or that D’s persuasive actions must in
some way have been ‘‘directed at’’ P.94 Yet inducing breach of
contract is designed to protect P’s contractual rights. Hence it
would seem suﬃcient for the contractual wrong to be intended, and
case that both Bagshaw (at 141 n. 31) and Wedderburn (at n. 14) cite in support of that
conclusion does not, in fact, do so. Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lowthian [1966] 1
W.L.R. 691 is a case where D sought (that is, intended) termination, by breach if necessary. It
is thus a case of conditional intention to procure a breach, not one of recklessness. The
judgment of Diplock L.J. makes this clear (at 704): ‘‘ignorance of the precise terms of the
contract is not enough to show absence of intent to procure its breach. The element of intent
needed to constitute the tort of unlawful procurement of a breach of contract is, in my view,
suﬃciently established if it be proved that the defendants intended the party procured to bring
the contract to an end by breach of it if there were no way of bringing it to an end lawfully.
A defendant who acts with such intent runs the risk that if the contract is broken as a result
of the party acting in the manner in which he is procured to act by the defendant, the
defendant will be liable in damages to the other party to the contract’’. Compare Rickless v.
United Artists [1986] F.S.R. 502 (in particular, the ﬁnal paragraph from the unreported
portion of the judgment by Hobhouse J.).
93 Millar v. Bassey [1994] E.M.L.R. 44, 64 (Peter Gibson L.J.). Compare K.W. Wedderburn,
‘‘Inducing Breach of Contract and Unlawful Interference with Trade’’ (1968) 31 M.L.R. 440,
445: ‘‘the ﬂood of liability would engulf not only trade union oﬃcials but also the most
innocent, competitive, proﬁt-seeking trader’’.
94 E.g., Weir, above note 4, at p. 13.
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unnecessary to show the intent further to harm P.95 That is no part
of the paradigm case above; moreover, the authorities are clear that
the presence or absence of malice (toward P) is irrelevant.96
In sum: partly because of the failure to separate prevention
from persuasion, the mental elements required for inducing breach
of contract are doctrinally uncertain and normatively controversial.
Our analysis of the wrongs involved in inducing breaches of
contract oﬀers tools with which to approach this problem. Let us
ﬁrst turn our attention away from consequential concerns such as
the incentives to free competition, and focus on the relation of
intention to the wrongness of D’s action. Distinguishing between
intended and foreseen interferences with contract is not merely a
matter of consequences, and of balancing the harm to P against D’s
freedom of action. In both varieties of inducing breach of contract,
the intention with which D acts is integral to the wrong that makes
D responsible for the harm that P suﬀers.
Consider prevention. In the paradigm case, D wrongs C by an
unlawful act, which in turn causes adverse consequences for P. If
we disregard D’s intention, prima facie D owes no duty to P: the
wrong is done to C. Typically, C may sue D for foreseeable losses
caused by the unlawful act; her claim in tort is predicated upon the
unlawful act itself, and contractual losses suﬀered by C are
recoverable as tort losses in so far as they are foreseeable
consequences of and not too remote from that unlawful act. By
contrast, P has no standing to sue in the unlawful-act tort: he is
not wronged by it.
What wrongs P, and brings the further tort of inducing breach
of contract into play, is that the unlawful act against C is
committed—C’s plight is created and used—in order to harm P, by
depriving him of something to which he has a contractual right. It
is the intention with which D acts that makes his conduct properly
described as a (wrongful) attack on P. This is typical of economic
wrongs. In a broadly free market, persons are left alone to pursue
their own interests. In so doing, they wrong no-one even if their
self-advancing conduct has deleterious side-eﬀects for others. Side-
eﬀects are a natural feature of competitive interaction: if I tender
successfully for a contract, I may know that in so doing I will
95 As Beldam L.J. pointed out in Millar v. Bassey [1994] E.M.L.R. 44, 51, ‘‘[i]t was not alleged
. . . in Lumley v. Gye that the defendant Gye had any intention to cause harm to the plaintiﬀ
beyond an intention that Miss Wagner should break her contract with him’’. See also Edwin
Hill & Partners v. First National Finance Corp. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 225, 234 (Stuart-Smith L.J.),
citing Smithies v. National Association of Operative Plasterers [1909] 1 K.B. 310, 316; South
Wales Miners’ Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. [1905] A.C. 239, 244 (Earl of Halsbury L.C.),
246 (Lord Macnaghten). Of course, whether or not intended, actual loss will be required for P
to be awarded damages.
96 Cf. Quinn v. Leathem [1901] A.C. 495, 510 (Lord Macnaghten).
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deprive others of that contract and, in turn, weaken their
commercial viability, cause employees to be laid oﬀ, etc. I do no
wrong unless my bid is tendered in order to bring those
consequences about; in which case I am no longer pursuing my
own interests but, instead, am attacking the interests of others.
That is morally wrongful even if I am attacking the interests of
others only as a means, ultimately, to advance my own interests (a
characteristic of wrongs such as dumping). Similarly, exploitation-
based wrongs depend on the fact that the defendant acts as she
does in order to take advantage of another’s weaker position.
Suppose that I price a good for sale at an unexpectedly high level.
To do so discloses no wrong if I am simply a reluctant seller—
perhaps the thing has sentimental value, or I know of another
person willing to pay a high price for it. But if my reasons for
asking a high price are that I know the buyer has desperate
personal need for the good, my action may become a wrong.
As it happens, this constitutive role for intention is not conﬁned
to the marketplace. We noted earlier that a judge who sentences a
criminal to jail may know that, in so doing, she will cause him to
lose his job and bring hardship upon his family. But she does no
wrong unless she sentences him in order to bring those outcomes
about. Patriotic support for one’s own team is acceptable, even if it
gives the team a home advantage; supporting one’s team by booing
the opposition is not, notwithstanding that it may produce an
identical advantageous consequence. The point is most famously
articulated by Kant. It is ipso facto wrong to treat other persons as
a means to advance one’s own preferences. We do that when we
intend harm to others; not when we seek a beneﬁt in circumstances
where adverse consequences occur just as side-eﬀects.
None of this is to deny that there are occasions where I can
wrong another person by harming her unintentionally—indeed, that
possibility underpins the tort of negligence. But the wrong in such
cases rests, in part, on a direct injury to the plaintiﬀ’s person or
property. In contrast, a victim’s economic interests are by their
nature exposed to the adverse eﬀects of others’ economic activity:
there is no general duty to avoid injury to economic interests and
the mere fact that those interests are harmed cannot establish that
D’s act wrongs the victim. This distinction is buttressed by the
consequential arguments, noted earlier, concerning the need not to
restrict public economic activity by extending liability to foreseen
side-eﬀects, and thereby hindering market competition and dispute
resolution through industrial action.
So it seems right that the tort committed when D prevents
performance of C’s contractual obligations should require an
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intention on D’s part to harm P.97 In prevention cases, D seeks to
harm P by depriving him of something to which he has a right.
That intention, addressed to P, combines with the unlawful act,
against C, to constitute a wrong against P where the harm to P, by
itself, is insuﬃcient.
What of inducing breach by persuasion? In persuasion, we have
seen that the wrong to P does not rest on a requirement that D
acted in order to harm P. It rests on D’s acting either to induce C
to break her promise or to induce C to rethink her promise to P—
to not treat her promise as the promise it is. These, then, are the
features of the tort that the mental element must reﬂect: it follows
that it is suﬃcient, but not necessary, to satisfy the mental element
if D intends C should breach her contract. Consider the following
example:
Jane has promised to give £100 to charity K. I know that she
made the promise impulsively, without considering the merits
of alternative charities. I oﬀer partially to subsidise Jane’s gift
if, as I urge, she will rethink her promise and instead give the
money to the charity that, upon reﬂection, she decides is the
most deserving; which may still be charity K. Jane thinks
about my oﬀer but decides to stand by her original promise.
This is an example where I intentionally undermine the status of
Jane’s promise as a pre-emptive reason, without intending,
ultimately, that she should break that promise. Correspondingly,
while an intent to bring about non-performance is suﬃcient,98 it is
not necessary. The mental element of inducing breach of contract
by persuasion requires only that D seeks to undermine the status of
C’s promise as a pre-emptive reason. As cases like Lumley v. Gye
demonstrate, there is no requirement that D acts in order to bring
about harm to P or even in order to bring about a breach of
contract. Rather, D seeks a response by C that, as D knows,
involves and requires a reconsideration of C’s promise to P. As
such, the reconsideration of C’s promise is not a side-eﬀect. It is an
inseparable means: a step in the reasoning through which C must
pass before accepting D’s oﬀer.
We see, then, that the often-cited formula, in which there must
be ‘‘knowledge of the contract and the intention of bringing about
its breach’’,99 accurately describes neither prevention nor
97 Both Falconer v. ASLEF [1986] I.R.L.R. 331 and Millar v. Bassey [1994] E.M.L.R. 44 should
be doubted for this reason.
98 For an example of the suﬃcient case, where non-performance itself is intended, suppose that
C agrees to sell an old clock to P. D then persuades C to keep the clock because it is a family
heirloom. D’s intervention is not aimed at harming P, but it is a straightforward case of
inducing breach of contract because D intends to induce P not to do what she promised.
99 Above note 86.
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persuasion. Prevention requires an intention to harm P, by
preventing C from performing. The mental element of persuasion is
satisﬁed by either knowledge that what D encourages is inconsistent
with C’s promise to P or an intention that C should not perform as
promised. In neither variety is recklessness suﬃcient. D’s duties to
P simply do not extend that far. In the economic torts, the
distinction between incidental and intended harms is critical. It is
right that D should not be permitted to attack P’s contract with C.
But it goes too far, and curtails D’s freedom of action too greatly,
that D should not be permitted to do anything that might
undermine P’s rights against C.
Persuasion and Advice
This same analysis can help to illuminate quarrels about what
forms of behaviour count as persuasion. Some commentators, for
example, assert a distinction between persuasion and advice, with
only persuasion being actionable.100 In general, those commentators
seek to draw the distinction by reference to objective features of the
D’s conduct: did he create a reason to break a contract or did he
‘‘merely’’ point out a reason that already existed?101 But that
account of the diﬀerence looks incomplete, since ordinarily one can
‘‘persuade’’ another to do something without having to create new
reasons for doing it: indeed, that is the marque of good argument.
At a deeper level, the account fails because it neglects the
intentional nature of persuasion. Although there are defective
varieties of persuasive action, in which one can fortuitously
convince another of a proposition, persuasion is characteristically
an intentional action. Hence it seems to us that the key question is,
what were D’s reasons for giving the advice?102 If D intended
thereby to bring about a reconsideration of C’s promise, there
seems no reason why D should evade prima facie liability for
inducing breach of contract,103 subject to any justiﬁcatory defence
that may be available. On the other hand, if D’s advice is genuinely
disinterested, and he is simply pointing out relevant considerations
without aiming to bring C to reconsider her promise,104 or indeed if
100 R.A. Buckley and R. Heuston, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st edn., London
1996), 352; H. Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (Oxford 2001), 47. Cf. D.C.
Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 686 (Evershed M.R.); Middlebrook Mushrooms
Ltd. v. TGWU [1993] I.C.R. 612, 626 (Hoﬀmann L.J.).
101 Cf. H.L.A. Hart and T. Honore´, Causation in the Law (2nd edn., Oxford 1985), 54.
102 Cf. Square Grip Reinforcement Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald [1968] S.L.T. 65, 73 (col. 2).
103 As Winn L.J. thought in Torquay Hotel v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 147. So, too, Simonds J.
in Camden Nominees Ltd. v. Forcey [1940] Ch. 352, 366: ‘‘[a]dvice which is intended to have
persuasive eﬀects is not distinguishable from inducement’’. Analogously, even a silent picket
may, because of the intention of the picketers, be persuasion: Union Traﬃc Ltd. v. TGWU
[1989] I.R.L.R. 127, C.A.
104 Cf. D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 686 (Evershed M.R.).
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C has already determined to break her contract and comes to D
seeking advice,105 D may plausibly lack the element of intention
necessary to make his response a wrong to P.
Indirect versus Direct Prevention
One remaining doctrinal quarrel goes to the heart of our thesis.
There is authority in English law for drawing a distinction between
direct and indirect prevention. As such, inducing breach of contract
has the potential to be subdivided across three paradigms:
persuasion, direct prevention, and indirect prevention.106 Recall the
case set out at the commencement of this paper:
Case 2 (prevention): C2, a car manufacturer, has contracted
with P2, a tyre manufacturer, to display P2’s tyres on C2’s cars
while the cars are being exhibited at a motor show. During the
show D2, a rival, removes P2’s tyres without permission and
replaces them with its own.
That is a paradigm of direct prevention of performance, where D
physically prevents C from performing her contractual
obligations.107 We can supplement that case with two further
instances:
Case 3 (unlawful ‘‘indirect’’ prevention): C3, a manufacturer of
machinery parts, has contracted with P3 to supply parts by a
certain date. Near to that date D3 persuades E, and other
employees of C3, to go on strike without giving proper notice.
As intended, the strike prevents C3 from fulﬁlling its contract
with P3.
Case 4 (lawful ‘‘indirect’’ prevention): C4 contracts to supply
widgets to P4. D4 subsequently buys up all the widgets available
in the marketplace, which as D4 knows will put C4 in a
position where she is unable to perform her contract with P4.
The existence of three possible categories has caused some
confusion in the case law, and considerable disagreement amongst
commentators, about how the categories should be assimilated or
diﬀerentiated. It is generally agreed that Case 4 discloses no cause
of action,108 in the absence of unlawful means. But what marks
105 Cf. Board of Broadview School Unit No. 18 v. Saskatchewan Teachers Federation (1972) 32
D.L.R. (3d) 33; Long v. Smithson (1918) 88 L.J.K.B. 223. See also CBS Songs v. Amstrad
Consumer Electronics plc [1988] A.C. 1013, 1058 (Lord Templeman); approved in Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Export Credits Guarantee Dept [2000] 1 A.C. 486, 499 (Lord
Woolf M.R.).
106 D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 681–682 (Evershed M.R.), 694–697
(Jenkins L.J.); Torquay Hotel Ltd. v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 138.
107 See D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 695–696, 702 (Jenkins L.J.); also
GWK Ltd. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. (1926) 42 T.L.R. 376.
108 Even by Lord Denning: Torquay Hotel v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 138: ‘‘[i]ndirect
interference is only unlawful if unlawful means are used’’ (italics omitted); D.C. Thomson &
Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 679–680 (Evershed M.R.), 696–698 (Jenkins L.J.).
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Case 4 apart? Does unlawfulness become requisite primarily
because the case involves indirect prevention, or because it involves
prevention rather than persuasion? These questions reﬂect an
underlying categorisation issue for legal doctrine: should direct
prevention (Case 2) be assimilated to (Case 1) persuasion, which
might also be thought of as direct, or should it be assimilated to
(Case 3) indirect prevention? Another way of putting this is to ask
whether, instead of distinguishing between persuasion and
prevention, we should be distinguishing between direct intervention
(by persuasion or direct prevention) and indirect intervention (i.e.,
indirect prevention).
If the argument in this paper is correct, the basic distinction is
that between persuasion and prevention—between inducing non-
performance through the medium of C’s intervening choice and
causing non-performance without C’s cooperation. Hence, direct
and indirect prevention should be treated together as instances of
the general tort of deliberately causing harm by unlawful means
and, as such, governed by the same set of doctrinal requirements,
subject—in the normal way—to the standard constraints of
remoteness that apply whenever someone commits a tort through
the agency of another person. Notice, in particular, that those
remoteness constraints are not speciﬁc to the prevention tort. They
apply to all torts, including even inducing breach of contract by
persuasion (should D use an intermediary to persuade C). There is,
in other words, nothing special about ‘‘indirect’’ prevention.
The point is controversial, partly because the cases frequently
describe persuasion as a form of ‘‘direct’’ intervention.109 Thus
some writers have argued that it is the direct/indirect dichotomy
that is decisive; on their view, directly preventing performance is
like persuading C to breach, and therefore subject to the same
doctrinal requirements that apply to inducement by persuasion.
McBride and Bagshaw, for example, assert that:110
If D has performed an act which directly prevented T from
performing his contract with V then D will have induced T to
breach his contract with V. . .. So suppose T contractually
agreed to sing for V one evening and D tied her up so that she
could not perform for V. Now if D acted in order to harm V,
V will be able to sue D on the basis that D committed the tort
of using unlawful means to harm another in relation to V in
acting as he did. But even if D did not try to harm V in acting
109 See, e.g., D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch. 646, 694, 702 (Jenkins L.J.);
Torquay Hotel v. Cousins [1969] 2 Ch. 106, 138 (Lord Denning).
110 N.J. McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law (London 2001), 333 (emphasis in original). The
authors’ claim that D will have induced a breach of contract is subject to the usual provisos
about D’s mental element and possible justiﬁcations. See also J.D. Heydon, Economic Torts
(2nd edn., London 1978), 29, 31.
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as he did, V will still be able to establish that D committed the
tort of inducing breach of contract. . . . In contrast, if D has
indirectly prevented T from performing a contract with V, V
will not be able to establish that D committed the tort of
inducing breach of contract . . . and so if V wants to sue D, V
will have to establish that D committed the tort of using
unlawful means to harm another in acting as he did and will
therefore have to establish that D used unlawful means to
prevent T from performing his contract and that D acted as he
did with the aim of harming V.
There are a number of reasons for thinking this analysis should not
be preferred. First, it would mean that in the case of direct
prevention, D’s act need not be unlawful (curiously, this is
concealed by McBride and Bagshaw’s example). Suppose, then, a
scenario in which C has agreed to sing for P and needs, now, to get
to the theatre. However, her car is misparked and D lawfully
clamps it; thereby, as D knows, preventing C from getting to the
theatre and putting her in breach of contract. Allen v. Flood
governs this case.111 As we observed earlier, in the absence of an
unlawful means, D is not and should not be liable to P for causing
C to breach her contract. Direct prevention by a lawful act cannot
be assimilated with persuasion.112
Of course, it may be argued that, at least where D intends to
harm P by preventing C’s performance, tort law ought to allow a
remedy notwithstanding Allen v. Flood.113 But the making of that
argument turns upon the fact that D intends harm to P: hence, it is
properly an argument about the restricted scope of the tort of
deliberately causing loss (by unlawful means), and whether current
law should be widened into a prima facie tort of intentionally
inﬂicting harm, as has sometimes been suggested in the United
States.114 The mens rea of such a tort is clearly more stringent than
is required to satisfy inducing breach of contract by persuasion.
And so it should be: in the absence of intention to harm, going
about one’s own business, while realising that one’s lawful conduct
111 [1898] A.C. 1; above notes 33, 57. See also D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin [1952] Ch.
646, 693 (Evershed M.R.), quoted above in the text at n. 31. Or suppose that C has
contracted to sell an asset to P. C is deeply in debt to D, who forces C into bankruptcy in
order to prevent transfer of the asset.
112 Heydon (above note 110) cites Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Kingswood Motors (Addlestone)
Ltd. [1974] 1 Q.B. 142 as authority that direct prevention can be a tort even when the means
are lawful. But Esso v. Kingswood does not support his analysis, since in that case D (also a
company) was the owner of C and the case is thus not accurately depicted as one of
‘‘prevention’’ by a third party. Moreover, the means used were in any event identiﬁed by
Bridge J. (at 155–156) as unlawful, since they constituted a civil conspiracy to induce a
breach of contract.
113 Finnis, above note 69.
114 For an interesting study of the American experience and the issues it raises, see C. Witting,
‘‘Of Principle and Prima Facie Tort’’ (1999) 25 Monash U.L.R. 295.
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will have adverse economic impacts on others, should not be the
stuﬀ of tort.115
Further, the proposed analysis makes too much turn on the
direct/indirect distinction, a distinction that, as drawn in this
context, is at best unstable and at worst incoherent.116 The
informing idea behind the distinction seems to be that direct
intervention requires no active human intervention to supply the
conduit between D and non-performance of the contract.117 Hence,
when D ties C up and prevents her from singing, his intervention is
direct. And when D persuades E to go on strike and thereby
prevent C from fulﬁlling its contract, his intervention is indirect
since it requires a further act by E. Bagshaw buttresses this analytic
dichotomy with a normative rationale:118
If this version of the distinction is accepted then the reason for
imposing, or at least considering imposing, diﬀerent standards
of liability in the indirect form is clear: We require special
reasons for making me responsible for the consequences of the
behaviour of another.
The normative point is true enough. Indeed, it is one of the reasons
why inducing breach of contract is philosophically so complex. But
its application does not track the direct/indirect distinction in the
way that Bagshaw expects. On a normative analysis, the case of
persuasion would be indirect not direct intervention:119 it requires a
further intervening act by C before P is deprived of performance.
Conversely, on the same analysis, buying up all the widgets and
thereby preventing C from fulﬁlling her supply agreement is direct
prevention—it requires no further actions by anyone to make
performance impossible. It is not obvious how, causally speaking,
this is any less direct a mode of prevention than is removing all the
car tyres, or indeed tying C up—what distinguishes the latter cases
is, rather, that the means in each is illegal. As conventionally
drawn, the direct/indirect dichotomy lacks moral signiﬁcance. It
oﬀers no moral tools of its own with which to diﬀerentiate the
various scenarios that we loosely call inducing breach of contract.
By contrast, we have argued in this paper that the persuasion/
prevention distinction is both analytically intelligible and morally
profound.
115 See the text above at pp. 157–8.
116 As Weir argues: A Casebook on Tort (9th edn., London 2000), 606.
117 Bagshaw, supra n. 65, at p. 148; ‘‘the most obvious way of drawing [the direct/indirect
distinction] is to ask whether the interference occurred through the acts or omissions or some
human agent interposed between the defendant and the contract’’. For alternative accounts,
oﬀered without normative underpinnings, see Greig v. Insole [1978] 1 W.L.R. 302, 334 (Slade
J.) and Middlebrook Mushrooms Ltd. v. TGWU [1993] I.C.R. 612, 625 (Hoﬀmann L.J.).
118 Bagshaw, above note 65, at p. 148.
119 Contra Bagshaw, ibid.
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CONCLUSION
We have not sought, in this paper, to resolve every issue to which
inducing breach of contract gives rise. Neither have we sought to
explain all the boundaries of the tort, or to reconcile every case.
Our concern has been with the central cases, with the heart of the
tort, because it is only when the paradigm cases and their structural
core are understood that we can begin to assess the diﬃcult,
borderline, cases that now populate the reports. We have argued
that inducing breach of contract by persuasion is a diﬀerent tort,
with diﬀering legal criteria, from inducing non-performance by
prevention. In persuasion cases, D is held co-responsible for the
breach of contract that C chooses to commit. In prevention cases,
direct or indirect, no such choice is made by C; D simply brings
about non-performance without reference to the wills of the
contracting parties. Indeed, although each is conventionally
regarded as a species of inducing breach of contract, the prevention
tort is in truth a species of the more general tort of deliberately
causing loss by unlawful means. Be that as it may, we have argued
that the diﬀering criteria and underlying rationales are not in
conﬂict. The two paradigms with which we began this paper
capture separate cases where state intervention can be justiﬁed.
Both causes of actions lie properly within a plaintiﬀ’s armoury.
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